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Introduction
Strategic considerations figure prominently in public discus-
sions of vice presidential selection. Certainly, this was evi-
dent in 2016. On the Democratic side, many observers 
speculated that vice presidential candidate Tim Kaine’s flu-
ency in Spanish would help Hillary Clinton to win votes 
among Latinos (Felix & Shaik, 2016; Krauze, 2016). 
Likewise, Kaine’s reputation as a “centrist bridge builder” 
might increase the ticket’s appeal to political moderates 
(Krauze, 2016), and as Virginia’s senator and former gover-
nor surely he could “deliver” that battleground state’s elec-
toral votes (Tribune News Services, 2016). On the Republican 
side, Donald Trump’s selection of Mike Pence reportedly 
“was made, in part, to help shore up conservative support 
throughout the Midwest and Rust Belt states” from which the 
Indiana governor hailed (Hillyard, 2016; also see McPherson, 
2016; Villa, 2016).
Recent empirical analyses cast doubt upon a running 
mate’s ability to secure an electoral advantage among select 
demographic groups of voters and voters within his or her 
home state (see Devine & Kopko, 2016; Kopko & Devine, 
2016). Nonetheless, the perception that running mates could 
produce such electoral advantages is widespread. But does 
that perception affect the actual conduct of a presidential 
campaign? Do the campaigns view the running mate as a 
unique strategic asset, to be deployed according to his or her 
(perceived) strengths, or as a means of reinforcement for the 
presidential candidate and his or her message?
It is possible, after all, that the strategic objective of 
choosing a running mate who appeals to voters alienated 
from, or less than enthusiastic about, the presidential can-
didate primarily is symbolic. In this case, the campaign’s 
goal simply might be to create the image of a well-rounded 
ticket and, in doing so, to improve perceptions of the pres-
idential candidate among skeptical but persuadable vot-
ers. The vice presidential candidate’s role, then, would be 
to echo a shared message of what the ticket stands for and 
campaign in a parallel fashion. Alternatively, the presi-
dential candidate might view his or her running mate as a 
more effective ambassador to voters who share a particu-
lar identity or affiliation, when those voters are 
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unrepresented at the top of the ticket. In this case, the 
campaign would strategically deploy the vice presidential 
candidate to engage such voters with direct appeals that 
exploit their common bond in a way that the presidential 
cannot—or, at least, not as effectively. Likewise, the pres-
idential candidate would skew his or her efforts toward 
appealing to voters with a shared identity or affiliation of 
their own. Essentially, the ticket would appeal to the same 
group of voters, as a whole, but divide its labors in such a 
way as to maximize receptivity by playing to each candi-
date’s (perceived) strengths.
Moreover, if the latter is true, then among which groups 
of voters—if any—can we reasonably discern that the cam-
paigns perceived the presidential versus vice presidential 
candidate to have a strategic advantage? For that matter, is 
there an empirical basis for discerning which advantages the 
campaign might have believed to be real and electorally con-
sequential when selecting the vice presidential candidate? 
Anecdotal evidence from the campaign trail might indicate 
such a perception; for instance, Tim Kaine made high-profile 
speeches entirely in Spanish to largely Latino audiences 
(Morin, 2016), and Mike Pence raised reporters’ eyebrows 
with “peculiar” visits to conservative outposts in rural 
America (Hillyard, 2016; also see Beaumont, 2016). But 
anecdotal evidence is not sufficient to establish patterns of 
activity and make reliable inferences; to do so, requires sys-
tematic analysis.
This study is the first to evaluate whether campaigns use 
the presidential versus vice presidential candidate dispropor-
tionately to appeal to voters with whom that individual shares 
a strategically advantageous affiliation (and, if so, which 
ones). To answer this research question, we analyze an origi-
nal database of campaign visits in the 2016 presidential elec-
tion, that includes population characteristics (i.e., demographic 
and political) associated with each locale that hosted a cam-
paign visit. Our analysis provides direct insight into the stra-
tegic considerations that reasonably might be inferred to have 
influenced specific vice presidential selections—in contrast 
to previous studies analyzing the strategic considerations 
influencing selection processes, generally (Baumgartner, 
2008; Sigelman & Wahlbeck, 1997).
To the extent that presidential tickets campaign in parallel 
fashion, echoing a common message targeted at the same 
voting constituency, we should find no systematic differ-
ences in the populations visited by either member of the 
ticket. Also, the candidates should visit the same locales 
roughly in equal proportions. Alternatively, if a campaign 
perceives that the presidential versus vice presidential candi-
date has a strategic advantage in appealing to voters who 
share a particular identity or affiliation, and campaign 
accordingly, the populations visited by each candidate should 
vary systematically and in accordance with the candidate’s 
characteristics. Also, the candidates should visit a given 
locale quite disproportionately, essentially dividing up the 
campaign’s “battleground” territory.
Why Campaign Visits?
Evaluating campaign strategy typically requires making 
inferences based upon patterns of resource allocation, as 
most scholars do not have direct access to the inner workings 
of a campaign (but see King & Morehouse, 2004; Shaw, 
2006) and campaign personnel either will not describe their 
strategy openly or cannot be relied upon to describe it accu-
rately. The most commonly cited empirical indicators of 
campaign strategy are candidate visits and advertising expen-
ditures—often described by political scientists as the cam-
paign equivalents of “time” and “money” (Bartels, 1985; 
Johnston, Hagen, & Jamieson, 2004; Shaw, 1999, 2006). The 
former, by many accounts, provides particular strategic 
insight; according to Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw (2002), 
“Most campaign strategists will say that a candidate’s time is 
the campaign’s most valuable resource” (p. 50; also see Chen 
& Reeves, 2011; King & Morehouse, 2004).1
Why is this the case? First, “Unlike financial resources, 
which depend on willing contributors, time is contributed by 
candidates and therefore controlled by them” (West, 1983, p. 
517). Second, candidate appearances—the principal means 
by which campaigns commoditize the candidate’s time—
serve a number of strategically valuable purposes, including 
providing a “controlled environment” (Wood, 2016, p. 111) 
in which candidates typically speak to “sympathetic, partisan 
audiences” (Holbrook & McClurg, 2005, p. 692) while 
attracting free, abundant, and largely positive local media 
coverage that is exceptionally likely to reach voters in the 
surrounding media market (Herr, 2002; Holbrook, 2002; 
King & Morehouse, 2004). In this way, campaign visits can 
serve to mobilize supporters through direct means, while 
also persuading undecided voters through indirect means 
(Jones, 1998).
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, candidate 
visits can be targeted toward particular groups of voters that 
a campaign seeks to mobilize or persuade. As West (1983) 
explains, “In a world of limited time, candidates must make 
choices. They must emphasize certain constituencies and 
deemphasize others. These choices are not random” (p. 525). 
Indeed, he finds that presidential candidates during the 1980 
primary and general election campaigns tended to speak to 
audiences that reflected their intended electoral coalition. 
For instance, Republican candidates who sought to expand 
beyond the party’s base were more likely to address audi-
ences of voters—including union members, Catholics, and 
racial minorities—who belonged to groups that traditionally 
aligned with the Democratic Party. Moreover, West (1983) 
finds that the candidates often made personalized appeals at 
these events, by “communicat[ing] their ‘identifications’ and 
sympathies with voters” (p. 517).
It is, therefore, reasonable that political scientists often 
use campaign visits—and, in many cases, advertising expen-
ditures—to make inferences about presidential campaign 
strategy. For example, resource allocations have been used to 
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discern whether campaigns seek to maximize their Electoral 
College versus popular vote totals (Brams & Davis, 1974), 
employ a “base strategy” of mobilization versus a “periph-
eral strategy” of persuasion (Chen & Reeves, 2011), and per-
ceive the vice presidential candidate as providing an electoral 
advantage in his or her home state (Devine & Kopko, 2016). 
The logic of our analysis mirrors that of previous studies: We 
infer the campaigns’ perceptions of strategic advantage based 
upon the pattern of choices that they made in allocating a 
resource generally within their control and regarded as valu-
able—namely, candidate visits. In essence, we seek to deter-
mine whether the 2016 presidential campaigns acted as if 
they believed that their presidential versus vice presidential 
candidates more effectively could appeal to voters with 
whom they shared a salient identity or affiliation.
Data, Hypotheses, and Methodology
Data for this analysis come from an original database of 
campaign visits in 2016—specifically, including visits made 
by either member of the Democratic or Republican ticket, 
between the vice presidential candidate’s official introduc-
tion (July 16 for Republicans and July 22 for Democrats) and 
Election Day (November 7). We use these data to test a series 
of hypotheses, described in this section, pertaining to the 
strategic allocation of presidential versus vice presidential 
campaign visits.
Data
For the purposes of this analysis, we define campaign visits 
as any public appearance—counted discretely, to include 
multiple visits within a given day—made by the presidential 
and/or vice presidential candidate that was apparently orga-
nized or selected by the campaign, or the candidates them-
selves, for the purpose of appealing to a localized 
concentration of voters. Included in this analysis are unsched-
uled events, such as visits to local businesses, restaurants, 
and campaign offices, provided that they involved direct 
interaction with voters and attracted media coverage. 
Excluded from our analysis are events that do not meet this 
definition, such as press conferences, private fundraisers, 
national conferences or conventions, and attendance at other 
nationally oriented events (e.g., the 9/11 commemoration in 
New York City).2
To identify qualifying events, first we consulted the can-
didates’ public schedules—from their campaign websites 
and other media sources—and then we verified the event’s 
occurrence, or in many cases discovered unscheduled visits, 
by searching for information from media websites and the 
candidates’ social media accounts. If we were able to vali-
date an event’s occurrence and location using two sources of 
reliable, direct documentation (e.g., coverage by a reputable 
news source, video footage, photos posted by the campaign),3 
we counted it in our analysis. If an event was canceled or if 
we could not document it properly, we excluded it from our 
analysis. In total, we identified 515 campaign visits—includ-
ing 88 by Hillary Clinton; 96 by Tim Kaine; 13 by Clinton/
Kaine, jointly (counted once for each candidate); 139 by 
Donald Trump; 130 by Mike Pence; and 18 by Trump/Pence, 
jointly (counted once for each candidate).
For each campaign visit, we also collected data on the 
demographic and political characteristics of the county in 
which it occurred.4 Demographic data were obtained from 
the U.S. Census Bureau,5 and they included estimates of a 
county’s population density, median income level, percent-
age of college graduates, African Americans, Latinos, mili-
tary veterans, and 2010-2015 population growth. In addition, 
we obtained county-level estimates for the number of evan-
gelical Protestants, mainline Protestants, and Catholics per 
1,000 residents, from the Association of Statisticians of 
American Religious Bodies’ 2010 U.S. Religion Census.6 In 
terms of political characteristics, we measure a county’s 
competitiveness as the squared difference in two-party vote 
share from the 2012 presidential election.7 Because party 
competition only roughly approximates ideology and there is 
no reliable county-level measure of the latter,8 we also esti-
mate local ideology using the DW-NOMINATE score for the 
U.S. Representative in whose district the event took place.9 
Finally, we include variables to indicate whether the visit 
took place in the presidential or vice presidential candidate’s 
home region, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.10
Hypotheses
There is ample evidence to suggest that presidential cam-
paigns often select vice presidential candidates at least partly 
based upon their demographic (e.g., home state, age, sex, 
religion) or political (e.g., ideology) characteristics 
(Baumgartner, 2008; Devine & Kopko, 2016; Goldstein, 
2016). Presumably, they do so in hopes of appealing to stra-
tegically important voters who share these characteristics—
even if there is very limited evidence that running mates 
actually win votes among these targeted groups (Devine & 
Kopko, 2016; Kopko & Devine, 2016). To the extent that 
campaigns perceive targeted appeals based upon shared 
characteristics to be effective and seek to capitalize upon 
them during the campaign, we should expect to find a posi-
tive relationship between a candidate’s demographic and 
political affiliations and the population characteristics asso-
ciated with his or her campaign visits. This is our overarch-
ing research hypothesis. From it, we can also derive more 
specific hypotheses for the Republican and Democratic pres-
idential tickets in 2016, using the population variables 
described above.
Based upon their demographic and political characteris-
tics or affiliations, we hypothesize that Mike Pence was more 
likely than Donald Trump to visit counties that were 
Midwestern (home region), more rural (population density), 
more conservative (ideology), and more populated by 
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traditional, middle- to upper-class members of the Republican 
establishment (income, college education) and evangelical 
Protestants (religion). Likewise, we hypothesize that Tim 
Kaine was more likely than Hillary Clinton to visit Southern 
(home region), moderate (ideology), battleground (competi-
tiveness) counties, with larger populations of Catholics (reli-
gion), and Spanish speakers (Latinos). Also, as both vice 
presidential candidates had sons serving in the military at the 
time of the campaign, we hypothesize that they were more 
likely than their presidential counterparts to visit counties 
with higher percentages of military personnel (veterans).
For the presidential candidates, we hypothesize that 
Trump and Clinton both were more likely than their running 
mates to visit northeastern (home region) and more urban 
(population density) counties, as well as ones with more 
mainline Protestants (religion). Also, based upon his cam-
paign rhetoric, we expect that Trump was more likely than 
Pence to visit White (race), working-class (income, college 
education) counties in economically distressed areas (popu-
lation growth). Given Clinton’s strong support among 
African Americans during the 2016 primaries (Kurtzleben, 
2016), we hypothesize that she was more likely than Kaine to 
visit counties with a higher African American population 
(race). Finally, as the first female major party nominee, we 
also hypothesize that she was more likely than Kaine to visit 
counties marked by indicators of socially progressive views 
on gender roles—including those that were more educated 
(college graduates), more wealthy (income), economically 
and socially dynamic (population growth), and less tradi-
tional (evangelical Protestants).
Methodology
To identify systematic differences in the strategic allocation 
of campaign visits, and test the hypotheses described above, 
we conduct a logistic regression analysis—separately for 
each party ticket—predicting whether a visit to a given 
county was made by the presidential (1) versus vice presi-
dential (0) candidate. The independent variables in our mod-
els include each of the demographic and political 
characteristics previously described. Also, we add a series of 
variables representing the number of times that each candi-
date, on either ticket, had visited the same county prior to the 
visit in question.
If it is the case that presidential tickets campaign as a 
united front, targeting the same constituency of voters, we 
should find that the demographic and political characteristics 
of a given population have no bearing on whether it was tar-
geted for a visit by the presidential versus vice presidential 
candidate. Also, with respect to previous campaign visits, we 
should find that each ticket essentially trades off visits within 
a given county; that is, if the presidential candidate has vis-
ited the county, the vice presidential will take the next turn. 
And the two will be equally likely to respond to a visit by 
their counterpart on the other ticket, rather than assigning the 
(vice) presidential candidate to counteract a visit by the 
opposing (vice) presidential candidate.
If, on the contrary, presidential campaigns differentially 
allocate campaign visits based upon the perceived electoral 
strengths of the presidential versus vice presidential candi-
date, we should find the opposite pattern. That is, the demo-
graphic and political characteristics of the local population 
should predict whether it receives a visit from one member 
of the party ticket or the other, and in a direction consistent 
with that candidate’s identity or affiliations. Furthermore, we 
should find that the campaigns largely divide up, rather than 
trade off, duties by county. In other words, a visit by the pres-
idential candidate to a given county should be positively 
related to the number of times that he or she previously has 
visited that county, and negatively related to the number of 
times that the vice presidential candidate previously has vis-
ited that county.
Results
To provide context—as well as some initial evidence—for 
the analysis to follow, in Table 1 we present the total number 
of presidential and vice presidential campaign visits in 2016, 
by state. Then, we compare visit allocations at the state ver-
sus county level, to identify potential differences in cam-
paign strategy—specifically, with respect to the activity of 
presidential versus vice presidential candidates—across ver-
sus within states.
Total Visits by State
It is clear from Table 1 that both candidates on a given party 
ticket generally campaigned in the same states. The 
Republican candidates visited 28 states in total, with both 
appearing in 16 of those states. While Trump visited six 
states that Pence did not (Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, 
Mississippi, Texas, Washington), plus Washington, D.C., and 
Pence visited five states that Trump did not (Georgia, Indiana, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Utah), very few of the ticket’s appear-
ances occurred in these states, individually or in total. In fact, 
286 of the Republicans’ 305 campaign visits (93.8%) took 
place in states that both candidates visited. Trump and Pence 
also visited states with similar frequency. For instance, the 
three states that Pence visited most often—Ohio (24), North 
Carolina (20), Pennsylvania (15)—also were tied for the 
second-most visits by Trump, at 19 apiece. Florida, the state 
that Trump visited most often (25), ranked just sixth on 
Pence’s list—the only major discrepancy in the data. Overall, 
there is a very high correlation (.859) between the number of 
visits that Trump versus Pence made to the 28 states on their 
campaign itinerary in 2016. Including the states that both 
candidates did not visit, the correlation is even higher, at 
.892.
The Democratic candidates visited 16 states in total, with 
both appearing in 10 of those states. Clinton visited just two 
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states that Kaine did not (Illinois and Nebraska), while Kaine 
visited four states that Clinton did not (Alabama, Texas, 
Virginia, Wisconsin). Again, most Democratic campaign vis-
its—192 of 210 (91.4%)—took place in states to which both 
candidates traveled, and with similar frequency. In fact, 
Clinton and Kaine most frequently visited the same four 
states, and in the same rank order: Florida (Clinton 23, Kaine 
26), Pennsylvania (18, 17), North Carolina (17, 15), Ohio 
(15, 10). Clinton’s and Kaine’s visits are even more highly 
correlated than those of their Republican counterparts—.906 
for the 16 states in which one or both candidates appeared 
and .938 when including all states.
Based upon this evidence, it appears that each presidential 
campaign used its presidential and vice presidential candi-
dates to target mostly the same subset of battleground states, 
and with almost the same frequency. However, this does not 
mean that the campaigns used each candidate to target the 
same population of voters. After all, states are diverse geo-
graphical units, and for various reasons—including those 
relating to the candidates’ identities and affiliations, as 
described above—campaigns might send the presidential 
versus vice presidential candidate to different parts of a state 
(e.g., a city or county) where they are expected to have 
greater appeal. If so, the similarities found in Table 1, with 
regard to the presidential tickets’ state-level campaign visits, 
might mask stark differences in the strategic deployment of 
candidates within the same states.11
Total Visits by County
Indeed, a parallel analysis of county-level visits shows much 
greater disparities between the candidates. First, most of the 
counties visited by a presidential or vice presidential candi-
date in 2016—180 of 258 counties (69.8%), overall—were 
visited by one member of the party ticket but not the other. 
Among Republicans, Donald Trump visited 108 counties, 57 
of which Mike Pence did not (52.8%); Pence visited 111 
counties, 60 of which Trump did not (54.1%). Among 
Democrats, Hillary Clinton visited 48 counties, 21 of which 
Tim Kaine did not (43.8%); Kaine visited 69 counties, 42 of 
which Clinton did not (60.9%).
In terms of total campaign visits, a sizable proportion took 
place within counties visited by one member of a ticket and 
not the other—for Republicans, 126 of 305 visits (41.3%), 
and for Democrats, 84 of 210 visits (40.0%). These figures 
are virtually identical for Trump (40.8%) and Pence (41.9%), 
but more disparate for Clinton (30.7%) and Kaine (48.6%). 
Most striking of all is the correlation between the number of 
visits per county by the presidential versus vice presidential 
candidate (including only the counties that were visited by at 
least one member of the ticket)—just .300 for Trump–Pence 
and .462 for Clinton–Kaine.
This analysis suggests an important conclusion about 
presidential campaign strategy in 2016: The presidential and 
vice presidential candidates on a given ticket did, in fact, 
tend to campaign in the same battleground states and with 
similar frequency, but at the same time they tended to cam-
paign in different parts of those states. Were those differ-
ences random, or systematically related to characteristics of 
the local population? And, if systematic, did the characteris-
tics of the local population match those of the candidate in 
such a way as to suggest the perception of a strategic advan-
tage based upon shared identity or affiliation? To answer 
these questions, next we analyze the local demographic and 
political characteristics associated with each campaign visit.
Bivariate Analysis
In this section, we estimate the empirical relationship 
between our dependent variable (DV)—coded to indicate a 
visit by the presidential (1) versus vice presidential (0) can-
didate on a given ticket—and a series of independent vari-
ables representing each of the demographic and political 
population characteristics previously described.12 Our first 
Table 1. Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Visits by 
State, 2016.
State
Republican ticket Democratic ticket
Trump Pence Total Clinton Kaine Total
AL 0 0 0 0 1 1
AZ 3 3 6 1 2 3
CO 10 7 17 3 2 5
CT 1 0 1 0 0 0
DC 2 0 2 0 0 0
FL 25 10 35 23 26 49
GA 0 3 3 0 0 0
IA 8 11 19 5 5 10
IL 1 0 1 1 0 1
IN 0 3 3 0 0 0
LA 2 2 4 0 0 0
ME 3 0 3 0 0 0
MI 9 8 17 5 5 10
MN 1 1 2 0 0 0
MO 0 2 2 0 0 0
MS 1 0 1 0 0 0
NC 19 20 39 17 15 32
NE 0 1 1 1 0 1
NH 9 9 18 3 7 10
NM 1 4 5 0 0 0
NV 5 5 10 9 4 13
NY 3 2 5 0 0 0
OH 19 24 43 15 10 25
PA 19 15 34 18 17 35
TX 1 0 1 0 4 4
UT 0 1 1 0 0 0
VA 9 13 22 0 5 5
WA 1 0 1 0 0 0
WI 5 4 9 0 6 6
Total 157 148 305 101 109 210
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step in doing so is to estimate the bivariate relationship 
between the DV and each population characteristic, using 
difference of means testing. Essentially, this analysis tells us 
whether the locales visited by the presidential candidate on a 
given ticket significantly differed from those visited by the 
vice presidential candidate, on average. We count each cam-
paign visit discretely when calculating a candidate’s mean 
population characteristics. As a result, the population charac-
teristics of a given locale are weighted according to the num-
ber of times that it was visited by the candidate in question. 
For instance, Hillary Clinton made five visits to Miami-Dade 
County, Florida, and one visit to Palm Beach County, Florida; 
therefore, when calculating the mean population characteris-
tics of a Clinton visit, Miami-Dade County has 5 times the 
weight of Palm Beach County.
Our bivariate analyses indicate some significant differ-
ences in the populations associated with a presidential versus 
vice presidential candidate’s visit, on both tickets. First, with 
respect to the Democratic ticket, Hillary Clinton visited 
counties with significantly higher percentages of African 
Americans, on average, than those visited by Tim Kaine. 
Also, the average population density associated with a 
Clinton visit is higher, albeit at marginal levels of statistical 
significance. Kaine, in comparison with Clinton, visited 
counties that were significantly more competitive in the 2012 
presidential election and had higher percentages of evangeli-
cal Protestants. Also, Kaine’s visits took place in signifi-
cantly more conservative—or, in context, more 
moderate13—congressional districts than Clinton’s. There is 
additional evidence, although marginally significant, that 
Kaine visited counties with higher percentages of military 
veterans and college graduates. Some of these differences 
clearly align with the respective candidates’ characteristics. 
Clinton, as noted above, had strong ties to the African 
American community. Also, she was a senator from one of 
the nation’s most densely populated states, New York, and 
her campaign headquarters were located in Brooklyn. 
Kaine’s visits align with his profile as a relatively moderate 
senator from a battleground state, whose son was currently 
serving in the military. It is less clear why he would cam-
paign in counties with more college graduates, and especially 
ones with more evangelical Protestants, as he is a Catholic.
Our analysis of the Republican ticket yields fewer signifi-
cant differences. Donald Trump visited counties with higher 
percentages of African Americans in comparison with Mike 
Pence, but this difference is only marginally significant. 
Pence visited counties with significantly higher percentages 
of mainline Protestants, in comparison with Trump, and 
more ideologically conservative congressional districts. 
Also, Pence was marginally more likely to visit states in his 
home region of the Midwest. The latter differences align 
with Pence’s profile as a conservative, Midwestern governor, 
whose role in the campaign, many believed, was to reach out 
to voters who shared these affiliations. However, it is less 
clear why he would campaign in areas with more mainline 
Protestants, as Trump—not Pence, an evangelical 
Protestant—shares this identity. Trump’s visits to more heav-
ily African American counties also seem surprising, given 
that his primary and general election campaigns were widely 
perceived as appeals to White, working-class voters. 
However, Trump announced his attention to appeal to African 
Americans during the campaign, and his pattern of campaign 
visits reflects just such an effort.
Of course, bivariate analyses are limited, methodologi-
cally, because they do not account for intervening variables 
and therefore might misidentify causal relationships. For 
example, it might be the case that Kaine did not visit counties 
with higher percentages of evangelical Protestants because 
he was trying to appeal to evangelical Protestants; rather, he 
might have been trying to appeal to ideological moderates, 
who just happen to live in counties with more evangelical 
Protestants as compared with the relatively liberal areas that 
Clinton tended to visit. To better disentangle the causal rela-
tionship between population characteristics and candidate 
visits, next we present results from a multivariate analysis 
conducted separately for each presidential ticket.
Multivariate Analysis
Table 2 presents results from two logistic regression models, 
analyzing campaign visits made by the Republican ticket 
(column 1) and the Democratic ticket (column 2) in 2016. 
The DV in each model is coded 1 for a visit by the presiden-
tial candidate on a given ticket, and 0 for a visit by the vice 
presidential candidate. The independent variables included 
in each model represent the demographic and political char-
acteristics of the geographic area in which a given campaign 
visit took place. In addition, we include four variables mea-
suring the number of times that each candidate previously 
had visited the county in question, to better understand how 
presidential tickets “share” (or do not share) campaign terri-
tory and respond (or do not respond) to visits by the opposing 
ticket.
The results in column 1 indicate that Mike Pence visited 
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and 
mainline Protestants, as well as congressional districts that 
were more ideologically conservative, than Donald Trump. 
Each of these differences is statistically significant at p < 
.05. Also, at marginal significance levels (p < .10), we find 
that Pence visited counties with a higher percentage of 
Latinos. Some of this evidence is consistent with the notion 
that Pence could more effectively appeal to traditional 
Republicans, including conservatives and individuals with a 
higher socioeconomic status, than Trump. Also, to the extent 
that Pence campaigned in more heavily Latino areas, this 
may reflect concerns that Trump was personally alienating to 
such voters given his harsh rhetoric on immigration and 
toward Mexicans or Mexican Americans. That Pence also 
campaigned in areas with more mainline Protestants is mys-
tifying, given that Trump shared this religious affiliation and 
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Pence did not. In fact, it may be even more interesting to note 
the population characteristics that did not predict a visit by 
Trump versus Pence. Contrary to popular perceptions of 
Pence’s electoral appeal, he was no more likely than Trump 
to campaign in rural areas, the Midwest, battleground states 
or counties, and among large populations of evangelical 
Protestants. As a whole, these results are decidedly mixed: 
On one hand, Trump and Pence campaigned in distinguish-
able locales that, in some cases, corresponded to salient 
aspects of their personal or political identity; on the other 
hand, the populations they visited were indistinguishable in 
most respects, some of which were commonly associated 
with the candidates and even viewed as likely reasons for 
Pence’s selection as a vice presidential candidate.
Further complicating our evaluation of the Republican 
candidates’ strategic partnership is the performance of the 
campaign visits variables. A visit by Trump versus Pence to 
a given county can be predicted, at conventional significance 
levels, by the number of times that either candidate previ-
ously had visited the county—but not in the direction that 
one would expect if the candidates were dividing territory 
between them, rather than sharing it. Indeed, Pence became 
more likely to visit a county as Trump’s previous visits to the 
same increased; likewise, Trump became more likely to visit 
a county as Pence’s previous visits to the same increased.14 It 
is also noteworthy that the number of campaign visits to a 
given county by the opposing candidates does not predict a 
visit by Trump versus Pence. This is not same as saying that 
the Republican ticket decided against responding to visits by 
their opponents, as our DV is constructed to predict a visit by 
one versus the other Republican candidate, not the ticket as a 
whole. However, one might suspect that such “response” vis-
its, to the extent that they occur, are made in kind, with the 
(vice) presidential candidate being commissioned to directly 
counteract the efforts of the opposing (vice) presidential can-
didate. Judging by these results, that is not the case.
We find a similar pattern of results for the Democratic 
ticket, in column 2. Indeed, the populations visited by Clinton 
versus Kaine are distinguishable in several respects. Clinton 
was more likely to visit counties with higher levels of recent 
population growth, whereas Kaine was more likely to visit 
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and 
evangelical Protestants. Also, Kaine was more likely to visit 
ideologically moderate, or less liberal, congressional dis-
tricts, than Clinton. Each of these differences is statistically 
significant at p < .05. Interestingly, but only at p < .10, we 
also find that Kaine was more likely to visit areas with a 
higher percentage of Latinos. The latter finding validates, 
albeit with limited confidence, the notion that the Democratic 
campaign perceived Kaine as having a strategic advantage in 
appealing to Latinos, due to his fluency in Spanish, and that 
this might have contributed to his selection as a vice presi-
dential candidate. The same can be said, with greater confi-
dence, about his perceived appeal to moderate voters that 
might have been alienated by Clinton’s liberal reputation. 
Table 2. Logit Models Predicting Presidential Versus Vice 
Presidential Candidate Visits, 2016.
Independent variables Republican ticket Democratic ticket
Population growth, 2010-
2015
0.058
(0.043)
0.206**
(0.071)
Population density 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Median income 0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
College graduate % −0.071*
(0.028)
−0.096*
(0.043)
African American % 0.020
(0.017)
0.025
(0.032)
Latino % −0.033†
(0.018)
−0.044†
(0.024)
Military veteran % −0.112
(0.084)
−0.167
(0.169)
Evangelical 
protestants/1,000
0.002
(0.002)
−0.018
(0.006)
Mainline 
protestants/1,000
−0.009**
(0.004)
0.007
(0.005)
Catholics/1,000 0.002
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.003)
Home region: 
Presidential candidate
0.106
(0.711)
−0.545
(0.696)
Home region: Vice 
presidential candidate
−0.588
(0.531)
0.343
(0.727)
County competitiveness, 
2012
−0.000
(0.000)
−0.000
(0.000)
State competitiveness, 
2012
−0.001
(0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
Congressional District 
Ideology
−0.701*
(0.290)
−0.857*
(0.405)
No. of previous visits: 
Clinton
−0.167
(0.216)
−0.462*
(0.200)
No. of previous visits: 
Kaine
0.020
(0.177)
0.552*
(0.221)
No. of previous visits: 
Trump
−0.789***
(0.230)
0.249
(0.222)
No. of previous visits: 
Pence
0.953***
(0.270)
0.402†
(0.241)
Constant 2.627†
(1.561)
5.815†
(3.000)
N 266 184
% Reduction in error 36.43% 48.86%
% correctly predicted
 DV = 0 (Vice 
presidential campaign 
visit)
67% 74%
 DV = 1 (Presidential 
campaign visit)
71% 77%
Note. The DV in each model is coded to represent a campaign visit by 
the presidential (1) versus vice presidential (0) candidate on a given party 
ticket. The independent variables represent county-level population 
characteristics, unless otherwise noted. Entries are logistic regression 
coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. DV = dependent 
variable.
Statistical significance: †p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Once more, though, it is unclear why Kaine would have cam-
paigned among more college-educated and evangelical 
populations.
But perhaps more striking, and in keeping with our find-
ings for Republicans, are the ways in which Clinton’s and 
Kaine’s campaign visits did not differ. Clinton was no more 
likely than Kaine to campaign in counties with higher popu-
lation density or more African Americans, and Kaine was no 
more likely than Clinton to campaign in counties with more 
Catholics or veterans, in battleground states or counties, or in 
the region encompassing his battleground home state of 
Virginia.15 Our conclusion echoes that stated above with 
respect to the Republican ticket: These are decidedly mixed 
results, some of which point to strategic differentiation based 
upon candidate characteristics and many more that do not.
Our results further parallel the Republican model when 
analyzing the campaign visits variables, with one minor 
qualification. Again, we find that the frequency with which 
Democratic candidates previously had visited a given county 
significantly predicts a present visit by Clinton versus 
Kaine—but in the direction of sharing, rather than dividing, 
territory. That is, Kaine became more likely to visit a county 
as Clinton’s previous visits to the same increased; likewise, 
Clinton became more likely to visit a county as Kaine’s pre-
vious visits to the same increased. In terms of responding to 
the opposing ticket, Trump’s previous visits to a county do 
not significantly predict a present visit by Clinton versus 
Kaine. On the contrary, Pence’s previous visits predict a 
present visit by Clinton—but at the marginal significance 
level of p = .095. Overall, Clinton and Kaine—like Trump 
and Pence—appear more responsive to their running mate’s 
activity within a particular county, than that of their counter-
part on the opposing ticket.
Finally, our models’ overall performance indicates that 
the allocation of presidential versus vice presidential cam-
paign visits in 2016 was not random but, in fact, fairly sys-
tematic when accounting for local population characteristics 
and other strategic considerations. For the Democratic ticket, 
our model accurately predicts which candidate visited a 
given county approximately three quarters of the time—77% 
for Hillary Clinton and 74% for Tim Kaine. And, in compari-
son with predicting which candidate visited a county based 
on random chance, alone, the model reduces prediction error 
by an impressive 48.86%. The Republican ticket proved less 
predictable, but still far from random in its visit allocations. 
Here, our model accurately predicts which candidate visited 
a given county at least two thirds of the time—71% for 
Donald Trump and 67% for Mike Pence. And, in comparison 
with a random prediction model, it yields a proportional 
reduction in error of 36.43%.
If each presidential ticket had campaigned as a unit, or if 
a particular candidate’s deployment on the campaign trail 
reflected no strategy other than that which guided the ticket 
as a whole, then predicting visit allocation patterns based 
upon the variables included in our model should have 
provided little, if any, empirical insight. Clearly, that is not 
the case.
Discussion
Do presidential campaigns believe that the vice presidential 
candidate provides a strategic advantage in appealing to vot-
ers with whom he or she shares a salient identity or affilia-
tion? And do those perceptions of an advantage influence the 
actual conduct of a campaign, such that presidential and vice 
presidential candidates disproportionately target their 
appeals toward groups of voters who share their personal 
characteristics? Or is the running mate’s role simply to rein-
force the campaign’s message, by multiplying—rather than 
diversifying—the presidential candidate’s efforts to commu-
nicate that message to a shared constituency of voters?
To answer these questions, we analyze an original data-
base of presidential and vice presidential candidate visits in 
2016. In particular, we compare the geographic areas to 
which either candidate on a given ticket traveled, to identify 
whether the demographic and political characteristics of the 
local population differed systematically between them, and 
whether those differences align with each candidate’s per-
sonal characteristics in such a way as to suggest the cam-
paign’s perception of a strategic advantage.
Our analysis indicates that the 2016 presidential and vice 
presidential candidates’ campaign visits differed signifi-
cantly, in many respects. First, although the candidates on 
each party ticket campaigned almost entirely in the same 
battleground states, and with similar frequency, their travels 
within states often diverged. Approximately 40% of each 
ticket’s campaign visits occurred in counties that the presi-
dential candidate visited but the vice presidential candidate 
did not, or vice versa. Moreover, the total number of visits 
per county by each set of candidates is modestly correlated, 
at .300 for Republicans and .462 for Democrats. By way of 
comparison, less than 10% of each ticket’s campaign visits 
occurred in states visited by one candidate and not the other, 
while the candidates’ total number of visits by state is highly 
correlated, at .859 for Republicans and .906 for Democrats. 
The campaigns’ evident coordination of state-level presiden-
tial and vice presidential candidate visits suggests a coherent 
strategy and the will, as well as the ability, to implement it; to 
assume that the much lesser degree of coordination within 
states somehow was not strategically motivated, then, seems 
unreasonable.
Our logistic regression models also indicate systematic 
differences in the allocation of presidential versus vice 
presidential campaign visits. For the Democratic ticket, we 
find that Hillary Clinton was more likely than Tim Kaine to 
visit counties that had recently experienced higher levels of 
population growth. Also, at conventional significance lev-
els, we find that Kaine was more likely than Clinton to visit 
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and 
evangelical Protestants, as well as more moderate 
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congressional districts; at marginal significance levels, 
Kaine was more likely to visit counties with higher percent-
ages of Latinos. For the Republican ticket, we find that 
Mike Pence was more likely than Donald Trump to visit 
counties with a higher percentage of college graduates and 
mainline Protestants, as well as more conservative congres-
sional districts. Moreover, at marginal significance levels, 
we find that Pence was more likely to visit counties with a 
higher percentage of Latinos.
This evidence indicates that while presidential and vice 
presidential candidates run together on the same ticket, and 
usually in the same states, their campaign activities are not 
merely parallel or duplicative. Vice presidential candidates, 
at least in 2016, frequently campaigned in different counties 
than the presidential candidate, and among distinguishable 
populations. But does this prove that the observed differ-
ences were strategically motivated? For that matter, can we 
reasonably infer that the vice presidential candidates were 
selected, at least in part, for the purpose of appealing to the 
populations that they visited disproportionately on behalf of 
their ticket?
Obviously, we cannot know the answers to these questions 
with any certainty. However, we do find evidence of an align-
ment between some of the population characteristics that pre-
dict a vice presidential campaign visit and the personal 
characteristics of that candidate, which at least suggests that 
perceptions of a strategic advantage might have influenced 
vice presidential selection. For instance, both running mates 
were significantly more likely than the presidential candidate 
to visit congressional districts that aligned with their ideologi-
cal profile—in Kaine’s case, more moderate districts, and in 
Pence’s case, more conservative districts. On the contrary, the 
demographic predictors of a vice presidential campaign visit 
are less clearly related to the candidate’s personal characteris-
tics, except for the marginal finding that Kaine was more 
likely to campaign in areas with higher Latino populations, 
and perhaps the finding that Pence was more likely to cam-
paign in areas with a higher percentage of college graduates 
(i.e., higher socioeconomic status). Indeed, many of the per-
sonal characteristics cited in public discussions of Kaine’s 
and Pence’s electoral appeal, prior and subsequent to vice 
presidential selection, had no evident effect on where they 
campaigned—including religious affiliation, population den-
sity, military service, or home region. This evidence under-
cuts any suggestion that the campaigns believed their running 
mates presented a strategic advantage in appealing to voters 
on these bases, or even selected them with such advantages in 
mind. For that matter, our analysis indicates that campaigns 
are more likely to value a vice presidential candidate’s ability 
to appeal to voters on the basis of ideological, rather than 
demographic, affiliation.
Indeed, we must not go too far in characterizing the 
 strategic significance of vice presidential candidates, and 
the degree to which presidential tickets diverge in the tar-
geting of their campaign appeals. While we have identified 
systematic differences in the campaign activities of presi-
dential and vice presidential candidates, in some respects 
those activities overlap. Perhaps most notably, our logistic 
regression models indicate that the candidates did not sim-
ply divide up the campaign battleground, repeatedly visit-
ing a designated sphere of influence to the exclusion of the 
other candidate. Rather, for both tickets, we find that the 
presidential candidate becomes more likely to visit a county 
as his or her vice presidential candidate’s previous visits to 
the same increase, and vice versa. This does not mean that 
the candidates trade off appearances, in tat-for-tat fashion, 
so as to visit each locale in equal proportions; the evidence 
already presented demonstrates that this is not the case. A 
more reasonable interpretation is that the campaigns require 
both candidates’ presence in counties deemed sufficiently 
important to merit multiple, or even many, visits. 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that while a sizable propor-
tion of campaign visits—approximately 40%, for both par-
ties—take place in counties not visited by the other member 
of the ticket, conversely it is the case that the majority take 
place in counties that both candidates have visited.
For these reasons, it would be a misinterpretation of our 
empirical findings to conclude that presidential and vice 
presidential candidates conduct divergent campaigns, target-
ing different populations of voters. It would be more accurate 
to conclude that, at least in 2016, the presidential campaigns 
coordinated their candidates’ activities so as to appeal to 
mostly the same voters while in some instances engaging in 
disproportionate allocations based upon the perceived elec-
toral strengths of either candidate.
Conclusion
This analysis makes an important contribution to existing 
scholarship on vice presidential candidates, and campaign 
strategy in general. First, whereas previous studies examine 
the patterns and electoral effects of vice presidential (as well 
as presidential) campaign visits (e.g., Althaus et al., 2002; 
Hill, Rodriguez, & Wooden, 2010; Shaw, 2006), ours is the 
first to test for systematic differences in the strategic alloca-
tion of campaign visits within a party ticket, based on demo-
graphic and political population characteristics. In doing so, 
we also provide direct insight into the strategic consider-
ations that may have influenced specific vice presidential 
selections—in contrast to previous studies analyzing the 
strategic considerations influencing selection processes, gen-
erally (Baumgartner, 2008; Sigelman & Wahlbeck, 1997). 
Finally, this research builds upon a limited number of previ-
ous studies that use local population characteristics to dis-
cern campaign strategy with respect to the allocation of 
campaign visits within, rather than across, states (Althaus 
et al., 2002; Chen & Reeves, 2011). Indeed, our analysis 
adds relevant variables not included in those previous stud-
ies, such as religious affiliation and ideology, that we find to 
be predictive of visit allocations.
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This analysis also suggests several valuable opportunities 
for future research. The most obvious such opportunity is to 
extend our methodology to past elections, so as to generalize 
or contextualize our conclusions about the strategic role of 
vice presidential candidates, beyond 2016. This is a practical 
goal, as there are identifiable strategic advantages associated 
with each vice presidential candidacy and they can be mea-
sured using the same variables, from the same data sources 
(e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, DW-NOMINATE, election 
results), employed here. Also, the empirical insights gained 
from this research can be used to better understand the effect 
of vice presidential, as well as presidential, campaign visits 
on voting behavior and state-level election outcomes. 
Specifically, one could investigate the potential moderating 
influence of strategically relevant local population character-
istics on the electoral consequences of campaign visits to 
determine whether those visits are more effective at increas-
ing voter turnout or party vote share when targeted toward 
populations that align with the characteristics of a particular 
candidate. In essence, this would extend our analysis by 
evaluating whether the campaign’s perception that a candi-
date has particular strength in appealing to an affiliated group 
of voters actually has the intended effect.
Such research might be useful to presidential campaigns, 
as well as scholars. As King and Morehouse (2004) note, in 
reference to the latter’s experience working as a strategic 
advisor and trip director for the Gore-Lieberman campaign in 
2000, that campaign’s leadership “did not base [its campaign 
travel expenditures] on any quantifiable data. They, like other 
campaigns before and after, simply know that candidate visits 
to targeted areas have a positive effect on voters” (p. 305). If, 
in fact, candidates’ visits are disproportionately allocated to 
appeal to groups of affiliated voters, but the anticipated stra-
tegic advantages prove to be ephemeral, then what the cam-
paigns do not know actually might hurt them. And, if the 
campaign’s anticipation of such advantages influences the 
selection of a vice presidential candidate who is less qualified 
to assume office if elected, then what they do not know might 
hurt all of us.
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Notes
 1. In most cases, presidential and vice presidential candidates 
make campaign visits separately. This makes campaign visits 
a more appropriate focus for our analysis, as we seek to draw 
comparisons between the strategic uses of either candidate as 
a campaign resource. Vice presidential candidates are much 
less likely to appear in campaign advertisements, and even less 
likely to appear independently of the presidential candidate. 
Therefore, we could not provide a robust comparison of “pres-
idential” versus “vice presidential” campaign advertisements.
 2. We use an original database for several reasons. Most impor-
tantly, we find that existing databases often include events 
(e.g., fundraisers, national media appearances) that do not 
meet the definition of campaign visits provided above, or 
exclude events (e.g., visits to local businesses or campaign 
offices) that meet our definition. Also, many of these data-
bases do not recognize the occurrence of multiple events in 
the same city or state within the same day, or they simply 
miss events that should have been included. Two examples 
will help to illustrate these discrepancies. Included in our data 
set is a campaign visit by Hillary Clinton to the Cedar Park 
Café in Philadelphia on November 6 (see CBS News, 2016), 
and a visit by Mike Pence to Congressman David Brat’s cam-
paign headquarters on November 5 (see Pence, 2016). Neither 
of these events is captured by the most prominent campaign 
visits databases from 2016, including FairVote (https://www.
nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016), National 
Journal’s Travel Tracker (http://traveltracker.nationaljournal.
com), and Democracy in Action (http://www.p2016.org/chrn/
fall16.html#2). In each case, these sources indicate only one 
campaign visit to the city or state on that day, and in some 
cases, they specify a more salient visit to the area (respectively, 
a church service and a campaign rally at a university) while 
making no reference to the additional visit. Thus, the existing 
databases omit—whether by design or by accident—events 
that meet our standards for campaign visits. Also, our data-
base—unlike Travel Tracker and, in many cases, Democracy 
in Action—cites media documentation for each visit, which 
allows us to precisely identify where the visit took place and 
thus accurately characterize the host county’s demographic 
and political characteristics.
 3. Specifically, we performed an Internet search using details 
(candidate name, city/state, event location if available) from 
the candidate’s public schedules, their social media accounts, 
or news items identified during these searches.
 4. We also collected data on the municipality (e.g., city, town, vil-
lage, borough) in which each visit occurred. We choose to use 
county-level data, instead, for three reasons. First, several of 
the population characteristics used in our analysis, such as reli-
gious identification and past presidential voting, are not avail-
able at the municipal level. Second, in more than 30 cases, all 
involving small local units such as villages and boroughs, we 
were unable to find U.S. Census Bureau data on many, if not 
most, of the population characteristics included in this analy-
sis. Finally, and most importantly, there is no doubt that the 
intended audience for a campaign visit typically extends well 
beyond the municipality in which it occurs, particularly due 
to local media coverage. Indeed, many studies of campaign 
visit (and other resource) allocations use the local media mar-
ket as their unit of analysis (e.g., King & Morehouse, 2004; 
Shaw, 2006). Although we find this approach reasonable and 
perhaps even preferable, it is not amenable to a study of local 
population characteristics because many of our data sources, 
such as the Census Bureau, do not provide data at the media 
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market level and often use measures such as median income 
that cannot be accurately calculated by merging data from the 
counties comprising a given media market. Moreover, many 
studies of campaign resource allocations use the county as 
their unit of analysis and provide compelling justifications for 
doing so. Chen and Reeves (2011)—whose research is most 
similar to ours, in that they analyze the relationship between 
local population characteristics and campaign visit allocations 
by each party ticket, generally—also cite as an advantage the 
accessibility of county-level economic, demographic, and con-
textual variables. Althaus, Nardulli, and Shaw (2002) analyze 
the effect of campaign visits at the county and media market 
levels, as well.
 5. Specifically, we used the Census Bureau’s “American 
FactFinder” (see https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/
pages/index.xhtml#) and QuickFacts (see https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/00) resources.
 6. See http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/
RCMSCY10.asp.
 7. Elections data were obtained from Dave Leip’s Atlas of 
U.S. Presidential Elections. See http://uselectionatlas.org/
RESULTS. To isolate the independent effect of county-level 
dynamics, we also include a similar measure for state competi-
tiveness in our empirical models.
 8. Indeed, the county competitiveness and district ideology 
variables (both squared) are not significantly correlated (r = 
–.058).
 9. See http://voteview.org/dwnomin.htm. DW-NOMINATE scores 
are based on the most recently available data, for the 113th 
Congress. Congressional districts were determined using the 
exact location for each campaign visit, which is recorded in our 
data set.
10. See https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/refer-
ence/us_regdiv.pdf.
11. Chen and Reeves (2011) identify just such a pattern when ana-
lyzing where the Democratic (Obama–Biden) and Republican 
(McCain–Palin) tickets campaigned in 2008. “It is well known 
that Republicans and Democrats were making appearances 
in largely the same states,” they explain, “but we find that 
within those states, they were visiting different counties” 
(Chen & Reeves, 2011, p. 541). Specifically, they conclude 
that McCain–Palin largely pursued a “base strategy” by visit-
ing counties that had voted more heavily Republican in the 
2004 presidential election, while Obama–Biden pursued a 
“peripheral strategy” by visiting counties with greater recent 
population growth (but not counties that had voted more heav-
ily Democratic or that were highly competitive in 2004).
12. As the purpose of this analysis is to understand why the presi-
dential candidate visited a given location instead of the vice 
presidential candidate, and vice versa, we exclude campaign 
visits in which both candidates appeared together (13 for 
Clinton–Kaine, 18 for Trump–Pence). We also exclude these 
cases, for the same reason, from the subsequent multivariate 
analysis.
13. The mean DW-NOMINATE score for Kaine’s visits was 
0.135, versus −0.166 for Clinton’s. These scores are coded 
to range from approximately −1 (most liberal) to +1 (most 
conservative).
14. In other words, if the Republican campaign had identified 
particular counties as being within Trump’s (Pence’s) sphere 
of influence, to the exclusion of his running mate, we would 
expect the Trump (Pence) visits variable to be statistically 
significant and positively (negatively) signed; that is, past 
Trump (Pence) visits to a given county would positively pre-
dict future Trump (Pence) visits to the same. Likewise, past 
Pence (Trump) visits to a given county should negatively pre-
dict future Trump (Pence) visits to the same. But we find the 
opposite pattern.
15. An alternative interpretation would be that Kaine, for instance, 
was no more likely to visit his home region because the 
Democratic campaign believed that his selection essentially 
secured its votes and therefore did not require much direct 
attention. However, North Carolina—neighbor to Kaine’s 
Virginia—received more visits by the Democratic ticket than 
all but two other states, and Kaine visited Virginia 5 times 
while Clinton never visited the state. Moreover, if the cam-
paign believed that a candidate’s affiliation with a geographic 
region or demographic group made it redundant, or less valu-
able, to engage the voters in question with direct appeals, 
then we might expect to observe significant differences in 
the other direction—that is, the candidate should be signifi-
cantly less likely than his or her running mate to visit affiliated 
populations.
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